








































	This paper focuses on IP (Intellectual Property) brokers. We define IP brokers as public or private companies bridging supply and demand of intellectual capital. We will here argue that IP brokers represent a key player in the market of patents, as their role in technology transfer can be that of active “market makers.”
	This paper is organized in three sections. The first section discusses how economic and sociological theories explain brokerage and its existence. We discuss how, according to these different perspectives, brokers are adding value to IP transactions.
	The second section investigates what brokers really do. This analysis is based on a set of semi-structured interviews with the leading IP intermediaries in the U.S. Main results suggest brokers not only provide a support function for IP transaction, but also play an active role in the creation of market opportunities. In other words, brokers do not simply exploit quasi-rental structural position created by temporary market imperfections, but are crucial in making patent transactions possible. They do not only “stay in between” supply and demand of innovation, but “play in between” by acting as entrepreneurs of complex transactions.





The aim of this paper is to explore intellectual property (IP) brokers. IP brokers are private companies or public organizations that bridge supply and demand of intellectual property.  Intellectual property can be defined as all the intangible assets for which the law grants individuals or a company exclusive rights and protection against improper use by third parties. Protection of intellectual assets occurs through patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. In this paper we will focus on brokerage of patents. A patent is a set of exclusive rights granted by a government to a person or organization for a limited period of time in exchange for the regulated, public disclosure of an invention. 
IP brokers represent a new phenomenon.. There are several reasons why an investigation of IP brokers could prove beneficial.
The first reason is that IP has become a central component of business models and transactions (Chesbrough, 2006). Companies can exploit their new knowledge internally or trade it with other partners. Internally, they can develop new products and processes directly through a nested set of patents and proprietary technologies. Companies can also trade their IP on secondary markets (Arora et al, 2001). They might for instance license their patents or reassign their ownership rights to an interested third party (Chesbrough and Di Minin, 2005).  The development, acquisition and commercialization of IP assets can become a fundamental component of a company’s business.  This is true in high-tech industries, where established companies like IBM and Texas Instruments, for example, get a large share of their revenues and profits from IP commercialization (Sullivan, 2000; Jones, Norris and Salomon, 2002). Other high tech companies, like Qualcomm and Rambus, base their entire business models on the exploitation of their IP assets (Tansey, 2005).  As IP becomes more relevant in modern economies, new players are beginning to emerge. This is the case of IP brokers. IP brokers do not develop new knowledge. They don’t do research and development, nor patent their ideas. They develop/improve patents by adding their expertise and skills. Without IP brokers, a market for this knowledge would be more difficult to develop and some ideas would either remain unexploited or undervalued. 

The second reason is that there are many different theoretical explanations for why IP brokers exist. Industrial organization, transaction cost economics, and structural hole theory partly address the issue of why “third parties” play a role in economic and social exchange. Industrial organization focuses on the efficiency of triangulation with third parties. Transaction cost economics explains why specific transactions require a third party to be completed. Structural hole theory suggests that untapped connections can be exploited  by proactive actors. These theories  are both useful and limited.  They are useful because they can help shed light on why in general brokers exist. They are limited, as they do not address specifically the peculiarities of IP brokers.
The third reason is that brokers might perform a wider role than what available theories suggest. By “playing in between” users and producers of new ideas, IP brokers can have a huge impact on transactions.  IP brokers might balance market imperfections and correct information asymmetries. This could facilitate transactions with a win-win solution for both parties. However, one might speculate that IP brokers exploit a monopolistic position, as they temporarily own information that is crucial for a transaction.  This not only redirects value from legitimate owners, but can also produce distortions on the markets. To consider the positive and negative effects brokers can have on IP markets, we need a thick description of their role and activities.
 To address these three points, we have organized the paper as follows: In the first section, we investigate why IP has become so relevant and address the characteristics of patents. In the second section we focus on theoretical explanations of brokerage and discuss how main theories address the issue of the role of “third parties” in economic and social exchange. The aim of this section is to explain IP brokers’ existence.  In the third section we provide a “thick” description of what IP brokers do.  This “thick” description is based upon qualitative, exploratory research we conducted in the U.S. between June and September 2006.  In the final section, we draw some tentative conclusions by comparing available theoretical propositions and main findings of the field research. We also develop some further propositions to be tested in a further study.

The increasing impact of IP in the modern economy

To understand where IP brokers “live,” we need to explore three aspects of the evolution towards an IP-based economy. We will here focus on the intrinsic nature of patents, relevant shifts in IP economy, and licensing practices. These three aspects necessitate the presence of IP intermediaries.
The first aspect of the IP economy which necessitates IP intermediaries is the intrinsic characteristic of patents: the right to exclude. A patent is a contract between the assignee and society. It establishes a quid pro quo which both facilitates the commercial exploitation of an invention and encourages the diffusion of knowledge that would otherwise remain secret. Technically, a patent grants the assignee a limited monopoly over some “claimed inventions” in exchange for the disclosure of the details that would allow a person “trained in the field” to reproduce the claimed inventor. The law grants assignees the right to exclude others to use or make the claimed invention. Moreover, assignees also have the right to dispose of their patents by granting licenses or reassigning these rights to other parties. These rights have a time limit, and as patents expire, knowledge and techniques become part of the public domain, anybody can get access to and apply them.  Patents grant the right to exclude. They do not grant the right to make, as other patents might impede the use or commercialization of an invention. If I own the patents over a technology which allows a keyboard to communicate wireless with a PC, I won’t be able to sell wireless keyboards without infringing patents granted to the inventors of the keyboard. I therefore have two options: getting a license over these patents or waiting for these patents to expire. Transactions among assignees are a normal consequence of a legislative system that grants effective IP protection. Transactions occur when parties are willing to trade and are satisfied with the terms and conditions of exchange. IP brokers can facilitate transactions by connecting previously disconnected parties and providing them with assistance.
The second aspect has to do with major shifts in the IP economy. Major legislative shifts in Europe and in the U.S. during the 80’s and 90’s have led to increasing enforceability and (consequently) greater value of IP assets. After the formation of a centralized appellate court in 1982 (the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in the U.S. the likelihood of winning a patent infringing case went up from 50% to over 70%, and general wisdom indicates this institutional change as the beginning of a “pro-patent” judicial period (Merges, 1992). In 1986 the “Kilby patent” decision set an important precedent in high tech industries, granting Texas Instruments a significant source of income and significant controlling power over the semiconductor industry (Grindley and Teece, 1997). The 1989 sentence in the Polaroid Vs. Kodak case showed that courts were not shy in setting high damage payments for a considerable infringement. Today multimillion settlements over infringements are not a rare occurrence; the $612 million paid by Research in Motion to NTP in order to settle a dispute over some patents that were supposedly infringed by the Blackberry device is only the latest example. In the main industrialized economies, the jurisprudence on patents and IP protection is still in full swing, and deep reforms to the patenting system are quite possible. Nevertheless the direction of change is that of an increasing protection for IP assets. In the meanwhile, during  the course of the 90’s, the number of patents granted by the USPTO (U.S. Patents and Trademarks Office) increased at an unprecedented rate. Empirical studies are still providing contradictory explanations behind the reasons of this surge in patenting, nevertheless the primary driver across industries in the U.S. seems to be a changed approach to management of innovation, while the “friendly court” hypothesis, and the presence of more technological opportunities, or higher investment in R&D remain  secondary and industry specific causes (Kortum and Lerner, 1999).
Patents increased not only in industrial sectors traditionally characterized by strong IP protection --like chemistry and pharmaceutical-- but also in semiconductor, telecommunication and IT, which were not accustomed to protecting and leveraging their IP. Patents have become an effective mechanism to better appropriate the results of R&D, increase revenue and gain contractual power through cross-licensing agreements (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Figure 1 provides data on patents granted by the USPTO between 1980 and 2004.
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Several high tech firms became anxious to protect their products against possible infringements. They began patenting as many of their technologies as possible, and the result is indeed a significant amount of overlapping patents of questionable quality. More patents do not necessarily mean better patents. In fact, the quality of most of what companies across industries are patenting is of little or no commercial relevance and difficult to correlate with shareholder value (Hall et al., 2000). While it is extremely difficult to estimate the share of granted patents that are going to be applied to products or enforced through licensing agreements, and whether or not the changed approach to IP will eventually lead to more “licensing intensive” times (Granstrand, 2004), estimates suggest that this percentage does not reach double digits (Teece, 2000). Forward patent citations are often used as a proxy for patent usefulness, and also here it is possible to notice an extremely skewed distribution, where a small minority of extremely important patents are receiving most of the citations from subsequent patent documents (Hall et al, 2001). Browsing through such an overcrowded market is indeed a difficult task and requires specialized know-how. IP brokers can indeed play a role in guiding companies through these waters. 
The third aspect has to do with licensing practices. Recent evolutions of the patenting systems led to an increasing separation between technology (and IP) providers, technology users, and integrators. Companies started to rely on the existence and functioning of an enlarging market for proprietary technologies. Patents’ primary role as a defending mechanism for a firm’s proprietary technology acquired a different importance. Patents became valuable components of market exchanges and a key element in transactions such as licensing or strategic alliances. 
The surge in licensing revenues and patents’ sale was the consequence of some eye opening success cases. In some situations, as traditional resources for investment in R&D declined, leading companies turned to the licensing of their existent IP portfolio as a possible source of income. One of the most successful examples of this has been IBM, which as early as 1995 officially recognized licensing revenue as an important item of its budget. Consistently throughout the next ten years IBM placed a lot of emphasis on the importance of licensing revenues:
The company's investments in R&D also result in intellectual property (IP) income. Some of IBM's technological breakthroughs are used exclusively in IBM products, while others are used by the company's licensees for their products when that new technology is not strategic to IBM's business goals. A third group is both used internally and licensed externally. (IBM Annual Report, 2005)
Texas Instruments, as mentioned above, also recognized the vital importance of licensing for its business:
Our Semiconductor patent portfolio is an ongoing contributor to Semiconductor revenue. We do not consider our business materially dependent upon any one patent or patent license, although taken as a whole, our rights and the products made and sold under patents and patent licenses are important to our business. (TI Annual Report, 2005).

As patents became a valuable components of market exchanges, several companies realized they lacked expertise and resources to directly manage their patent portfolio. The same holds true for independent inventors. Independent inventors have limited resources and are not very likely to commercialize their technologies. Independent inventors can also experience problems in getting crucial information about potential buyers and licensees. Transaction costs in dealing with companies can become unbearable. 
Universities and public research centers have also entered the patent business. Universities and public research centers are a significant source of potential patents. Since the approval of the Bayh Dole Act (1980), University Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) have significantly increased their presence in technology markets. The number of patents filed by university researchers have surged. The same holds true for  licensing agreements between universities and corporations (Markievicz and Di Minin, 2004). 
More players are turning to patent transactions as a critical function for both their technology transfer and knowledge exploitation. While for some of these companies, institutions and individuals this represents the core of their business models, for others licensing is one of the various forms of technology sourcing and new modes of exploitation for internally developed assets (Cesaroni et al., 2004). One might assume that when patent transactions are critical, players would directly manage them. At the same token, specialized players like IP brokers would be better off when patent transactions are infrequent. However, assuming that frequency of IP transactions is an independent variable is not fully convincing, as companies deeply involved in the IP business do use IP brokers. Neither does it help in understanding what IP brokers really do. Brokering IP is a special, multifaceted business.

Brokers in the IP world

Brokers are common in everyday economic life. Whenever we deal with buying, selling or renting a house, getting an insurance policy, or trade options and futures in the financial market, we rely on the services of a specialized agent.  This agent makes the transaction possible by guaranteeing both parties an acceptable solution among the ones available. To do so, a broker might perform a variety of different tasks that are required for the the completion of a transaction. Thus we can assume that under specific circumstances the transaction would not occur or would be much more difficult were a broker not present. Common sense suggests this might be true in several circumstances. Consider for instance the real estate market, where brokers gather, process and distribute information about possible deals at a low cost. In most cases, sellers would not be able to properly indicate their intentions.  They also could not capture signals coming from prospective buyers. As a result, some market transactions would not occur even though both parties were present and would be better off in closing the deal.
A common way to explain why brokers exist is to assume that markets and economic exchange are characterized by imperfections. If information were homogeneously distributed and freely accessible so that no asymmetries existed, perfectly rational agents would be able to conclude transactions in their own interests without need of any assistance. Homogeneous information and perfect knowledge would make the presence of a broker unnecessary. According to this view, brokers are a temporary, viable solution to existing imperfections. Still under these circumstances brokers might play a positive or negative role. Brokers are efficient as they offer a second best solution to agents. Brokers can temporarily mitigate markets imperfections and provide reliable, trustworthy information. They can also provide legal assistance and control for free-riding behavior. On the other hand, brokers might also represent an obstacle to market efficiency, as they could be a primary source of information asymmetry. Brokers can convey limited information or hide relevant information. As brokers act opportunistically, if their reputation is not at stake, or if there are scarce rewards for playing fair (Merges, 1999). However, this type of brokerage is doomed to disappear as industry matures. As knowledge of the market diffuses, the bridging function of brokers looses its appeal. Companies can skip the intermediaries and directly manage their IP transactions. 
Transaction costs economics (TCE) makes less restrictive assumptions about economic activity (Williamson, 1975). Brokers serve a valuable purpose only under specific circumstances. TCE views hierarchies and markets as two alternative governance modes to perform transactions. Depending on asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty, hierarchies or markets are better off in performing transactions.  For instance, markets are better off in governing transactions on commodities. A commodity does not require high costs for collecting relevant price, setting up and reinforcing contracts. Transactions for commodities are usually standardized agreements, making switching costs negligible or absent. Companies are better off in governing highly asset specific transactions. Hierarchy allows for a tighter control on opportunistic behavior. Making rather than buying avoids lock-ins, as in the case of a company relying on a non-substitutable supplier.  
Transaction cost economics subsequently recognized that hybrid governance modes are also possible (Williamson, 1985).  Thus, while hierarchies and markets remain polar modes, other different governance structures are also possible. Trilateral governance is possible when transactions are occasional and of mixed and highly specific kinds. Third parties and intermediaries might play a role as they reinforce the institutional setting needed to make transactions happen: “thus rather than resorting immediately to court-ordered litigation – with its transaction-rupting features—third party assistance (arbitration) in resolving disputes and evaluating performance is employed instead” (Williamson, 1985: 75).  TCE recognizes that the cost of contracting, enforcing the contract, and dealing with unforeseen circumstances vary (Bailey & Bakos, 1997). Brokers can match buyers and sellers, thus reducing costs of search. Brokers can also act as agents of trust. They can shield buyers and sellers, protecting them from opportunistic behaviors by other players. 
TCE offers a parsimonious explanation of why brokers exist. Brokers can help buyers and sellers in setting up appropriate governance modes to execute risky transactions. This is specifically the case of patents, whose value is difficult to ascertain precisely and where several contingencies are at work. TCE maintains that brokers offer buyers and sellers an insurance policy against malfeasance. Thus TCE implicitly equals brokers to regulatory institutions or substitutes of contractual regulations.  This way, brokers exist because transactions have specific features that cannot be governed through polar modes. According to TCE, brokers stay in the middle. Note that TCE explanation of why brokers exist is compatible with the one offered by classic industrial organization (Tirole, 1988). As specialized agents, brokers can facilitate the market by reducing  operative costs. They can benefit from economies of scale and scope and reduce bargaining asymmetry. TCE and industrial organization assign brokers a “bridging” function. Their role is to “stay in between” and connect market players that want to engage in transactions but cannot do so efficiently on their own. 
A second way of explaining why brokers exist is to assume that brokers “play in the middle.” According to this view brokers are not equidistant with respect to the transactions, or the partners involved. Brokers have their goals and do more than simply regulate  transactions. Brokers leverage their tacit knowledge and assets to define new business models and act as “active bridges,” not merely to connect parties that are seeking to engage in a market transaction, but also creating the opportunities for such a transaction. Obviously brokers do so by following their own agenda and pursuing opportunities that economic and social structure might offer. The notion of structural holes and a network approach are fundamental in conceptualizing brokers as proactive players. Brokerage is a function of structural holes in a network structure  (Burt, 1992, 2005). A structural hole exists when two people or groups are unaware of value available if they were to coordinate. A structural hole refers to a missing element of coordination. Structural holes imply resources are unevenly distributed. Distribution can be random or occur in densely knitted clusters. Within these clusters homogeneity is normally high. Individuals spanning several clusters are in the position of exploiting differences. People spanning structural holes are more likely to have good ideas. Bridge relations are the channels through which discussion changes opinions and behavior. Brokerage is the act of creating value by filling in the hole.
In reviewing existing literature, Burt (2005) suggested two possible ways of controlling for effects of brokerage. One is to study returns to the people connected by brokers; the other is to study returns to the broker. Garmaise & Moskowitz (2003) studied the effect of brokers in the commercial real estate market and found that brokers substantially raised the probability that a transaction was financed with bank debt.  However, there is not compelling evidence that brokerage itself leads to success and superior business. 
Despite its potential advantages, brokerage is not a simple support function. Brokerage can be realized in several ways. Putting in contact two parties who share similar interests or could have common goals is one way. Brokering is a complex and multidimensional activity, and information transmission is only one component of the broker’s role in orchestrating a deal (Pollack, Porac, & Wade, 2004). Brokers can transfer from a cluster to another best practices and routines. Also, brokerage can take the form of analogy and of synthesis. Thus brokers may add distinctive, unique value  (Hergadon, 1998). This is for example the case of internal brokers. Internal brokers share complex knowledge between very distant contexts in large organizations (Cillo, 2005).
In conclusion, we have three common, but distinct, explanations of why brokers exist and what they do. These theoretical approaches converge when considering asymmetries as a natural prerequisite for brokers’ existence. For TCE, asymmetries are embedded in transactions. By limiting their negative side-effects, brokers facilitate market exchange. For the structural hole theory, asymmetries exist between densely knitted cliques. By bridging them, brokers leverage their position.
Industrial organization, TCE and structural hole theory, however, do not explicitly address the issue of IP brokers. Nor do they explain what value IP brokers actually add (to what). More recently, Teece (2005) provided indirect support for IP brokers’ relevance by discussing the interplay between patenting, firms’ boundaries, and firms’ specialization. Building on an argument explored by Arora & Merges (2001), Teece suggests that IP combined with complementary and proprietary assets allows companies to successfully leverage the results of innovation. In other words, patents might indeed encourage more dispersed sources of innovation; however, access to key complementary assets is going to determine success or failure of an innovation. Knowledge of the industry as well as ownership of the essential IP are key ingredients. Companies might not have both at the same time. Hence, we argue, a significant role can be played by IP brokers. 
Despite what was indirectly suggested by Teece, current literature does not offer a convincing explanation of IP brokers or fully addresses their role in the patent market. Despite scientific and technological progress, specific environmental and competitive changes might explain why IP brokers have become key players. In terms of what brokers do, our hypothesis is that they are doing more than what existing theories suggest. Our empirical analysis explains this hypothesis through a “thick description” of intermediaries’ activities and a detailed account of the services provided. 

METHODS AND DATA 

Due to the exploratory nature of our research, we chose a case-study approach. A case study approach is beneficial as it creates a foundation on which to build new theories and to explore new phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989). This alternative was mandatory due to the lack of any public data about IP brokers and the scattered nature of information we were able to get from primary sources,  such as associations’ directories and existing databases.

Our first task was to identify and select IP intermediaries. No comprehensive directory of IP brokers exists. We relied on secondary sources of information and used a snowball technique to build our sample. Through exploratory interviews with industry experts, key informants and TTO professionals we were able to come up with a tentative list of IP brokers. This first task proved to be quite straightforward. In an industry where relationships are key, knowledge about “who is who” is rather diffused at least among key players. Also, once we identified and contacted IP brokers, getting their feedback was facilitated by the fact that most of these companies were eager to share their view of the industry and discuss their business models. While confidentiality issues arose (as will be discussed below) many of the interviewees welcomed the opportunity for higher visibility. Biases for such an approach are inevitable. Less well know companies did fall off our radar screen and we were unable to get information out of those companies still operating in stealth mode. Nevertheless, the convergence of opinions expressed in the course of semi-structured interviews allows us to be confident about the general validity of results here described.
Through the process of snowballing and conducting interviews between May and September 2006, we were able to identify, select and collect non-confidential information from 14 companies. Only two other firms were not available for comments. Table 1 lists interviewed companies included in this study. We believe they represent a satisfactory representation of the larger universe of U.S. intermediaries.
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For each company we interviewed one of the general partners or top managers. Interviews were in person and lasted between one and two hours. Each interview was transcripted and edited with the feedback we got from the interviewees. In several cases we did a second interview to discuss specific topics more in depth.
Our second task was to come up with a clear understanding and possibly a “thick description” of what IP brokers really do. Interviews were divided in two parts. In the first half we discussed general market and business trends to get an overall understanding of the industry. In the second part we asked specific questions about the company, i.e., its origin and foundation, area of specialization, activities carried out, examples of specific deals, and financial performances. Whenever possible, we double-checked the information we got and asked respondents to give us their view on other respondents’ comments.







IP brokers are a recent phenomenon even in the United States. Ten out of fourteen of these companies were founded after 2000. Their headquarters are evenly distributed between East Coast and California, namely Silicon Valley. While the reader might think that this is the result of convenience sampling, as we searched the area where we were physically located at that time, we were told that Silicon Valley and California are home to a large population of IP brokers. If one thinks about the concentration of high-tech industries in these areas, it makes perfect sense that IP brokers would be localized mostly near the companies they will work with. Also, the dot com boom of the 90s and bust of the early 2000s left a high concentration of unexploited IP up for grabs among the ruins of many failed start-ups.
Companies acting as IP brokers are recent. Only  three of the fourteen cases we examined appear to be a continuation of pre-existing activities. However, partners and founders have been around for longer period of times. In our sample, we found evidence of several entrepreneurial paths. 
A first path has to do with an inventor willing to leverage her own experience in patenting. This is the case for instance of Science+Technology, whose founder entered the business of brokering after experiencing several problems in leveraging his own invention in video-games. Realizing how problematic it was to extract value from a patent and get support for marketing, he founded a company that engaged in a variety of commercialization and support functions, such as market evaluation, product design, and product commercialization, once the patent has been issued. According to the founder of Science+Technology, “we realized there were inventors willing to develop their patents. They were technically very skilled but totally lacked commercial and marketing expertise. We decided there was a market for patents held by individuals that was worth exploring.”
A second path has to do with professionals and managers who started their own company after a long period of time in IP management offices of large companies. This is the case of Intellectual Ventures. One of its founders used to be a senior manager and key technologist at Microsoft. Having perceived that there were opportunities to explore, he teamed up with other professionals to leverage his previous knowledge and contacts. 
A third path has to do with lawyers and professionals who teamed up with business colleagues to offer integrated services. This is the case, for instance, of Inflexion Point Strategy. These companies  are usually the outcome of partnerships among experienced individuals who decide to team up and become independent IP brokers, and in so doing raise enough capital to finance their operations. Pre-existing ties and common background turn out to be, in some cases, very beneficial, as one of the informants clearly states, “we had common background in high-tech and were very complementary… as soon as we realized we wanted? to experience an entrepreneurial career teaming up looked natural.” The experience of large multinational companies, public centers and universities provided the foundation for dealing with patents and offered risk-seekers an opportunity to start their own company. 
A fourth path has to do with bold entrepreneurial activities backed by prominent private firms. This is the case for instance of IP Value Management. IP Value Management is backed up by capital of important institutional partners such as General Atlantic Partner and Goldman Sachs. Another example is the already cited Intellectual Ventures. Intellectual Ventures is a specialized IP broker that aggregates and manages underutilized patents. Contrary to the vast majority of IP brokers we interviewed, Intellectual Ventures seems to violate one of the basic assumptions of traditional brokerage; that is to never directly own its traded assets. Even if the company would not comment on the size of its patent portfolio, nor on the identity of the investors, business press insists that Intellectual Venture managed to aggregate and control thousands of patents within a few years and that its operations are financed by companies such as Microsoft and Intel.
Degree of specialization among IP brokers varies. Some of them – roughly half of our sample – are mainly focused on one or two industries. This is clearly the case of very complex industry, like electronics, IT or biotech, where patents are key in protecting knowledge in several domains, and where integration of various technologies, often in the hands of different companies, is a necessary step towards product development and commercialization of an electronic gadget or a drug. Specialization remains rather high for IP brokers who spun-off from larger companies. For the rest of our sample, specialization is not a crucial issue. These IP brokers cover several segments of high-tech industries and sometimes also mature ones. In these situations, key competitive advantage is given by a bundle of activities such as patent evaluation, IP identification, and value extraction. 
We found only two IP brokers with operations in Europe, and a third one who is about to open its offices overseas. Although all IP brokers are giving Europe and other areas serious consideration, they also suggest that the U.S. market is extremely rich in opportunities and remains their priority for the next future. 
If we consider only the companies that decided to disclose this information (6 out of 12) the average size is around 20 employees. Since most of the companies were not able to provide us data about the volume of their operations, it is not possible to estimate the share of patent transactions that are served by these companies and in general we cannot speculate on how representative this sample is of the entire population. Most of the companies are privately owned and decided to share information about the sources of their funding only under condition of anonymity. In most cases, we learned that traditional venture capital firms, big investment banks, and large high tech companies are heavily financing some of the most well known intermediaries. Only a few companies claimed to rely exclusively on seed capital from their founders and individual partners. 
All informants agreed that brokerage in general has become more common and that the IP market is growing. Informants did not provide an estimate of the global market, and they were very circumspect in seizing their specific markets. However, they agreed on several general factors that were triggering the IP market.
The first factor is increasing patent intensity, an observation that is consistent with available data. As the market grows, it becomes possible to trade patents as any other goods. Already discussed institutional factors, as well as deliberate company strategies, ultimately drove these changes. Thus, the existence and development of a market for patents provides a common ground for specialized players – other than buyers and sellers. As the market grows, it becomes more and more difficult to monitor all possible patents that might impact a company’s business. As one of the informants put it, “available public information is not enough (..) public data must be complemented by a deeper analysis and an overall understanding of the context (..) the patenter, its strenghts and weaknesses, as well as the prospective buyer stakes and interests all become relevant.” Consistent with what might be expected, development of the market for patents implies a general need for up-to-date, reliable and customized information. The variety of the information required is great. For instance, a company might want to know whether a specific patent exists, who the owner is, and whether or not the owner is willing to license or sell it. In a similar vein, a company and even an individual who has patented an innovation may want to know whether a company is infringing its patent rights. Information needs might be very complex, so that brokers appear to be tapping in a general need. Some of our informants suggested that one of the first brokerage activities in the United States was a directory listing key information on the most relevant patents​[2]​. However, it is more than a simple matter of “publishing information.”.
The second factor is what we label “increasing compelling IP blindness.” As technology evolves at a faster pace and becomes more convergent, companies pursuing innovative strategies might violate other companies’ rights. This is the case because time to innovation and time to market are way shorter than the whole process needed to file a patent and to have it granted. As a result, companies might end up unconsciously violating existing patents. As one of the informant stated, “infringing a patent can occur inadvertently… companies developing an innovation cannot know for sure whether or not they are infringing existing patents.”.
No matter how many resources they commit to IP management, companies can not monitor all possible innovators. Therefore, IP brokers might be better off in scouting the market for patents. This is especially true for patents that have been filed but not yet granted. Such information is crucial for a company willing to buy a specific patent. The same holds true for a small company that depends on R&D and whose main asset is IP. It is unlikely that such a company would be able to allocate resources for investigating who is infringing its patent, nor would have the expertise to negotiate an agreement where technical, business and legal issues converge.
The third factor is that patents and IP management in general have become part of company strategy and sometimes one of companies’ core revenue stream. Such an increased attention to IP management by medium and large companies does not necessarily imply only in-house solutions. Large companies staffed with IP management practices might need consulting services from specialized companies. As one of the informant put it, “we have contacts and knowledge outside the industry we mainly do business with(..) so every time there is a patent with a possible application in several domains, we are requested to do business and technical due diligence to assist our client.” At the same token, small-medium companies that lack needed resources must rely on external services to protect and value their patents. It is not usually the case that small-medium companies have a specialized internal unit; they do not patent on a regular basis, and patenting is not supposed to be one of their main activities. 
	IP  intermediaries in our sample are brokers that do license or reassign patents. IP brokers in our sample are mostly specialized either in licensing or in selling. 
---------------------------------
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Licensing makes sense when original assignees are seeking to obtain a continuous revenue stream, but lack the resources or have difficulty accessing the complementary assets necessary to invest in the commercialization of these technologies. For established companies, licensing out internally developed technologies can represent the lightest form of business diversification.  Negotiation between licensor and potential licensees can be tricky, but common standard and general formats offer a solid base for finding mutually acceptable solutions. Licensors normally grant rights to manufacture and/or distribute their originally assigned inventions in exchange for a percentage of total sales. 
IP brokers intervene in licensing through (1) IP assets evaluation (2) market identification and selection (3) negotiation. 
During the first phase, IP assets are analyzed on technical, business and legal bases. Initial evaluation is normally followed by a more detailed analysis in order to understand the real market potential. As one of the interviewed managers stated “inventors normally overestimate potential of their patents and underestimate costs associated with turning patents into a prototype or a product.”
IP brokers develop a detailed analysis of the patent potential by relying on a knitted web of professionals. These professionals are normally key-players in their area of expertise. Scientists and technical experts normally carry out a technical evaluation of the patent. They make sure that patents are truly innovative from an industrial point of view and give advice on how to define commercial solutions building from the technology that patents read on. Market consultants and business experts perform a market due diligence. They assess market potential for the product, its strengths and weaknesses, as well as potentially interested licensees. IP lawyers scrutinize the patent and its claims to assess whether or not the title has all the needed legal prerequisites for being licensed or commercialized. IP brokers normally directly perform these activities in situations where inventors are individuals or small companies. When inventors are large companies, brokers normally assist internal units to perform these activities.
During this phase, several interviewees suggested that “team work, which combines internal resources with external ones” is extremely critical. The wider and more reliable their net of experts, the more reliable the final assessment and the smoother the whole process. As an outcome of this phase, a patent gets bundled with an overall technical, business and legal evaluation. IP brokers also take care of selecting a qualified group of potential licensees, and they enter in negotiation for a potential deal. The majority of the interviewees claimed that “evaluation lies at the core of our business model.” One manager, who was specialized in managing entire IP portfolios on behalf of customers, claimed that “the way through which we scrutinize a patent portfolio and identify its strengths and potentials is possibly our most important trade secret.”
Selection and negotiation also have the potential to be extremely high value added activities.  Whether a potential licensor is going after a quick return for an isolated invention or an healthy revenue stream for a large bundle of patents, the identification of the right licensee is critical for the success of the operation, since normally licensing revenue will be tied to the sales of products reading on the licensed IP assets. 
Relational capital and knowledge of possible future markets are going to make the difference in the eyes of the broker’s client. “The first difficult task [for this stage] is to identify which industry is going to be interested to this technology, and to market it accordingly,” as technology providers will generally outsource to IP brokers the commercialization of technologies for which either the market is not clear, or if it is quite distant from the traditional market where the company operate. The ability to connect distant markets is therefore often a “creative effort that is required by my company,” as one of the interviewees put it. 
	In licensing, IP brokers are therefore acting as business developers. Sometimes they have to envision a new market for a new product, bring to the table both inventor and licensee, mobilize other resources and provide market and business intelligence to have the deal closed. As one of the interviewees put it “developing a business plan that makes sense out of a patent is sometimes a very demanding job(..) luckily it is also very creative and challenging, as success depends not only on how robust and advanced the patent is (..)sometimes the rest is as important.” And in this “rest” lies the core of the broker’s business. While the first cases of IP intermediaries were doing little more than bridging informational divides, the professionalization of IP brokerage led them to provide a more complete package of services in assisting a licensing transaction.
Licensing can also be the end result of a very different process. Instead of playing in the middle, an IP broker can also become representative of the inventors. IP brokers’ main task is to control whether or not other companies are infringing the inventors’ IP. Infringement is common and therefore “patent trolling” has become a very prolific, and profitable, niche. In this case IP brokers, but more often lawyers, assist inventors to make sure they can benefit from the output of their innovation. Assistance requires a deep understanding of a patent in its technical, business and legal aspects, as well as a deep knowledge of the companies of a specific industry. Assessing whether or not an existing company is violating a patent is not an easy task by any means. A threat to sue a company must be credible and IP brokers can effectively assist individuals and small companies to make their threat believable. Licensing and settlement are the ending point of this process, where legal skills are predominant. Also, the boundary between a genuine infringement allegation and a frivolous charge is not always an easy one to draw. Some IP brokers have gained the undesirable reputation of being “IP Trolls,” meaning that their main purpose is to get a quick payment by spamming dozens of established companies with infringement claims of dubious strength.
When IP brokers assist companies seeking to reassign their patents, they operate in ways similar to what we have discussed in the case of licensing. In the case of a technology provider the identification of the best possible buyer is critical for the maximization of the price that the potential user is going to be able to pay. An important difference can be however discussed when describing the role intermediaries have in assisting buyers scanning the market for possible acquisitions of third party’s technologies.
IP brokers act as a shield when representing prospective buyers. They guarantee anonymity by keeping prospective buyers’ signals from being sent across the market. As one of the interviewees stated, “companies are worried not to let competitors know what they are after(..) they prefer closing deals in the dark.” They also avoid closing deals in which the price is high only because the prospective buyer is a large company; “sometimes it is so difficult to assess the real value of a patent that people use rules of thumb like a fixed percentage of the total revenue of the buyer,(..) but when large companies are involved inventors become greedy and ask for unrealistic compensations(..) IP brokers can help assessing a right value.”
The need for anonymity and even more so a marketplace for tradable IP is the intuition behind yet another evolution of IP brokers from information to complete service providers. Patent auctions have so far registered mixed success and most of the interviewees confirm general skepticism about the future of companies based on such business ideas. Nevertheless, the perspectives offered by proponents of such a vision are rather compelling. “Patents, such as commodities and stocks will soon require their own exchange place” where demand and supply meet in the most efficient way. According to one of the respondents, “investing in a patent can be a more transparent form of investment than buying stock of a company. When you buy a valid patent, you invest in the future of a technology, and if the market for technology is efficient, this technology will find its most appropriate adopter.”
IP brokers representing buyers can also scout the market on a continuous basis to select patents the buyer might be willing to acquire. Reasons might be different and not necessarily “aggressive”, as for example using a patent for entering a new market. Companies might also be willing to buy patents for defensive reasons, like to prevent competitors from threatening infringement charges. Companies might prefer to leave patents in their archives and avoid unnecessary risks. In this case, IP brokers add their knowledge both in terms of industry and process. They not only have to be very knowledgeable about a specific industry, but must also know how to collect and control useful information about patents acting as antennas on a specific market. This antenna role often cannot be directly performed by large companies. As one broker puts it “due to our reputation we can collect critical information without revealing how we will be using it (..) we have a net of informants that is very large and very reliable (..) we can also approach inventors and propose them a deal without revealing whom are we working for.”




IP brokers’ origin and growth is largely accounted for by the factors we have mentioned above. Interviews confirmed that increasing patent intensity, increasing compelling IP blindness and IP as part of the companies’ strategy have contributed to the growth and diffusion of IP brokers.
IP brokers are not all alike. IP brokers differentiate in the way they make IP transactions possible. Many models do and will coexist. The picture we walk away with is an extremely rich one, and this section attempts to provide the reader with an overview of an industry that we believe is still in full swing. 
Two variables are helpful in understanding IP brokers and differentiating their business models.  The first variable is how much value they add to patents. Patents’ value has two components, one intrinsic and one “context-specific.” The intrinsic component could be measured in an ideal auction, where bidders would consider only the nature of the technology and the essence of the claims on the patent document, in determining how much they would be willing to pay for a reassignment or a licensing agreement. The “context-specific” component is the value companies attach to patents when they use them for defensive or offensive reasons, no matter how much money they can directly extract. This is the case of a patent that a company can buy on the open market in order to prevent a competitor from having it. Clearly, the amount of money paid for the patent only partially reflects the “true,” objective value of such an asset. What we observe on the secondary markets of technologies are transfers whose value is based on the combination of both the intrinsic and the context specific components.
IP brokers’ contribution to IP value varies. At one extreme we might have IP brokers that add little value, as their role is limited to “pre-market” stages, for example,  a consulting law firm helping a company or an individual to file a patent or to extend a patent in a foreign country. Although important, this IP broker covers only a small section of all activities that have to be performed so that a patent can produce value. At the other extreme, we might have an IP broker that builds portfolios of patents. They might target the most promising scientific and technological domains, bring together inventors, get ideas and suggestions from them, control for the legal aspects, file patents and commercialize them in different formats. Clearly, in this case, their value added is more substantial.  
The second variable is commitment in the transaction. Commitment has two components. The first component depends on how the incentives are or are not associated with closing the deal. For example, if IP brokers take an upfront fee, their commitment to close the deal is limited. If, however, success fees is the only way they will be paid back, their commitment will be high. The second component has to do with the investment an IP broker is willing to make in a transaction and the risk he/she is willing to take. For instance, an IP troll who enforces patents in only one industry and sends a large number of infringement letters is only putting his/her reputation on the line (if that), thus bearing a very moderate risk. On the other hand, an IP broker that invests his/her own capital and specializes resources to make a deal would bear a high level of risk.
These two variables, value added and commitment, identify different categories of IP brokers, as expressed in Figure 2.
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Each category differs based upon the value added to patents and its commitment to the transaction. The lower left most category is consultants. Companies often use consultants in IP intermediation. Consultants are normally retired managers or professionals knowledgeable about specific domains. These consultants often come from law consulting firms that did not want to add business and market services to their portfolio. Consultants might provide companies fresh and reliable information, suggest contacts, and give advice about how to proceed. Consultants rely upon their personal network. They have been with the industry for years, are knowledgeable about existing companies and can easily search among start-ups. Although their contribution might become relevant -- as in the case of skilled consultants who are assigned full responsibility of a patenting process by a company – consultants normally add little value. Consultants act on a personal basis. They do not usually mobilize or invest large resources. Their knowledge of the market and of the companies is normally limited to specific geographic areas. Consultants’ commitment to a transaction is also limited. Unless consultants take on other roles, they do not take up an entrepreneurial role and are normally paid by flat fees, sometimes associated with variable incentives. 
The second category, in the lower left quadrant, is IP brokers acting as “shields” to hide possible buyers’ identity.  Buyers do not want to be visible for several reasons. First, they don’t want to send signals to the market and to competitors, which would threaten their strategic processes. Buyers do not want to be visible, at least in the early stage of transactions, to prevent the price of a possible deal from skyrocketing due to their reputation or market power. Under these conditions, buyers prefer to use IP brokers as a shield. Shields are not very committed and their contribution to the transaction does not go beyond the contractual phases of the deal. Possible buyers do most of the job; they identify hot technological areas, search for competitors’ activity and possible start-ups and analyze the potential impact of the patent both from a business and market viewpoint. Shields also take limited risks, as they leave the scene pretty soon.
A third category is formed by IP promoters. Prospective customers for these  intermediaries are companies already established in a specific market that want to consolidate or widen their IP portfolio or protect their position against hostile moves. These companies are not interested or are not able to perform a detailed scan of the market and sometimes lack the technical expertise to evaluate the exact trajectory of a specific technology. IP promoters act on behalf of companies that are either interested in acquiring patents or are trying to monetize some of their unexploited IP. IP promoters are more autonomous and creative than pure shields. They may, to some extent, protect the identity of buyers, but their main value added is a more informed and imaginative knowledge of potential “downstream” markets for a particular technology. IP promoters might be instrumental in helping a market or a technology grow.  Without IP promoters, small companies and start-ups that have filed promising patents would have a hard time collecting all complementary resources needed to turn a patent into a product or even begin the process.  By scanning the market and investigating  new technologies, IP promoters act as “connectors” between previously unconnected actors. Foreign or large multi-product companies might need their services, when they seek to understand what are the key IP issues to diversify into an industry they are not familiar with. IP promoters “play in the middle” in the sense that they do not always respond to their customers specific requests. They might have a high degree of autonomy and be proactive in suggesting that their customers pay attention to specific scientific and technological areas. Compared to consultants and shields, IP promoters  add more “context specific” value and their commitment to the transaction is also higher, as they usually get rewarded through success fees. 
In the lower right quadrant we find IP evaluators. In this case, brokers take the role of consultants for both parties. This happens not because buyer and seller (or licensor and licensee) lacks the expertise needed to evaluate a patent, but because both of them need a third, specialized and possibly neutral opinion. The  role of IP evaluators is delicate, as a clear, standard methodology for evaluating patents does not exist. Each patent is by definition “unique” so that assessment and evaluation require specialized skills. This role is especially critical during mergers and acquisitions, as patents are often the most attractive assets for possible buyers. Under these circumstances, IP brokers provide assistance and facilitate the liquidity of the market. IP evaluators add value to the extent that they provide specific knowledge. IP evaluators don’t add much value if they only do an “hands-off evaluation”. IP evaluators might add high “context specific” value if they provide specific knowledge to the transaction, or use unique, innovative internal evaluation processes. IP evaluators bear some risk as their reputation is on the line when wrong evaluations are produced. 
The fifth and sixth categories, formed by IP deal makers and IP aggregators, are characterized by high value added and high risks. IP deal makers are brokers that complement patents with various services. They might carry out preliminary scientific, technical and business investigations to assess the potential of a patent.  They might also develop a component or a product, at least as prototypes or find possible customers or directly build up a knitted web of partners to do the whole job. IP deal makers are therefore highly involved and they add high intrinsic and context specific value to the patents. The same holds true for IP aggregators. They help developing patents which they will acquire in order to build portfolios or platforms of intellectual capital. This strategy is risky, as it requires a high volume of financial resources. Pay back might be difficult and materialize only in the long term. However, by building portfolios of patents in specific domains, these brokers are in the position of adding high, unique value. 






IP brokers are a new phenomenon. While brokerage is quite common in several domains and businesses, only recently has it emerged as a crucial activity in IP rights, namely in patents. 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we have presented reasons why IP brokers emerged and why they are likely to expand. A more prolific scientific and technological environment, and a more favorable judicial one, paved the way for IP brokers as specialized companies, which however emerged as a consequence of a changed approach to innovation management of companies. In this article, we have explained their origins and what trends have reinforced their presence. Our research setting was limited to USA and specifically California, and this was not by chance. We believe IP brokers tend to emerge and be co-localized in highly innovative areas. The reasons are simple. IP brokers are up to now small-medium companies with limited resources. They mostly rely on personal contacts and close relationships. This is a common trait in business life, but we have reasons to believe that in the patent market this is even more critical. Patent holders, prospective licensors and prospective buyers need to work out their relationship in such a way as to find a mutually satisfactory equilibrium. IP brokers are fundamental in this respect. By building trust, understanding each party’s requirements and by collecting the needed resources, IP brokers can become “market makers.” Becoming a market maker is more likely in highly specialized innovative areas.  Although we expect IP brokers to emerge in other various locations, we argue that most advanced technology clusters will be a favorite site for IP brokers. 
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Capital Value Partners	Assisting buyers and sellers
Inflexion Point 	Consulting in licensing
Intellectual Ventures 	Patents portfolio builder
IP Investements Group	Transaction and licensing services
IP Strategic Group 	IP Consulting
IP Value Management	Licensing and patent transactions
IPotential 	Assisting buyers and sellers
Mayo 	Licensing in-licensing out
Science+Technology 	Business development from patents
SRI International 	Licensing-selling
Stanford TTO 	Licensing
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